Category Archives: History

What is Fascism?

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Many people claim—most often with despair—that we’ve elected a fascist president to the American White House. And a worse offense could not be fathomed by many who thought the time had finally come for a woman president.

Now, I’m not a Trump supporter or a Trump opponent. Though it may seem like a paradox, I take a broader and a more specific view. If you want more thoughts on that, sign up for my email! So, having said that, I don’t have any agenda in this post with encouraging readers to any extent of support or disdain. As with many of my posts, my purpose here is to bring clarity, not to utilize hyperbole to influence opinion. I believe that good opinion must be well-informed.

So, the accusations have been sounded: Trump is a fascist! And yet, I would guess that many who throw this term around do so with a tragic level of ignorance about the genuine meaning of the ideas involved with and behind fascism.

And to be clear (does that sound a bit too Obama-ish?), fascism isn’t a clear-cut set of ideas. Although Germany and Italy both followed fascist ideologies, there were certainly differences. Still, a generally good idea of the commonalities of various fascist regimes can be accurately identified.

So what is fascism? A bit of history helps, as usual.

Benito Mussolini

Fascism as a formal ideology with a political platform was founded by Benito Mussolini in Italy. During World War I, Italy had joined the fight on the side of the Allies in time to benefit, they hoped, from the peace terms. Yet, many in Italy were unsatisfied with the terms that finally emerged from Paris in 1919. Additionally, war debt and economic stagnation plagued the country, like most countries in Europe, and the popularity of socialism and its extreme version of Marxist-communism saw a huge leap in popularity.

Keep in mind that many socialists were actually opposed to communism, a point I’ll clear up in coming posts. But for now, it is suffice to say that a general desire for social and economic control by the government had become increasingly popular since the early 1800s, and the desire to implement this control by revolutionary means and authoritarian regimes saw a surge in the wake of World War I.

A quick point of distinction. Marxist ideas (ie, communism) place the worker as the center and central unit of society. Ultimately, Marxism advocates for the dissolution of political boundaries in favor of a united working class and the elimination of private property in favor of commonly-shared means of production and eventual social, economic and political equality. That this can never actually be realized notwithstanding, it was reaction to this idea that spurred the creation of the Fascist Party.

In Italy, the Fascist Party was started as a distinctly anti-Bolshevik (many communist parties took the name of their Russian counterpart) party. At its heart wasn’t the plight of the working class, but rather the pursuit of national glory. In direct rejection of the dissolution of political boundaries, its adherents sought to glorify the nation-state, epitomized by the government of that nation-state. And more specifically, the glorification of the nation-state being the foundation for political morality and the highest of ends, violence in pursuit of power and glory was not only condoned; it was celebrated. You might call fascism fiercely aggressive nationalism. Fascists and Bolsheviks broke out in fire fights across Italy prior to Mussolini’s rise to power in 1921, and when he was in power, Mussolini had no qualms about banning all other political parties and ensuring the “disappearance” of any potential political rivals. We see similar trends in Germany with the rise of the Nazi Party and their first attempt at sparking revolution in Germany in 1923 (which failed). Clearly, later actions by the Nazis in Germany followed the fascist praise of violence with precision.

On the economic front, fascism is profoundly socialist and admittedly anti-capitalist. (I discuss related terms and ideas here.) Mussolini and fascists in other countries, like the Nazis in Germany, ultimately sought to control and oversee the economy with strict regulation and direct take-over of major industries, setting up government-protected and directed monopolies. Bear in mind that this was the common trend of western society (and had been for a decades) and it was Mussolini’s economic policies that Franklin Roosevelt in the United States admired and sought to emulate (without the direct violence).

Romanesque Fasces

One more point of interest. In pursuit of the glorification of the Italian nation-state (created as a merging of multiple distinct regions in the 1860s), Mussolini adopted the Roman symbol: fasces. Obviously, this is where the name comes from. It is a symbol of national unity, strength, glory and power. The ax included epitomizes its praise of aggression. The fasces, in line with other Romanesque cultural elements adopted by the U.S. government, can be found in our capital, but often without the ax.

Knowing what fascism is and where it comes from helps to debunk the idea that fascism is merely passionate nationalism*. It is its celebration of violence to achieve its ends that distinguishes fascism. And despite and cultural conservatism it brings with it (such as celebrating the cultural traditions of the nation), it is also distinctly anti-capitalist and authoritarian.

If you’re up for a more extensive reading on Fascism, here is a link to a very thorough article over at Mises.org. At that post, author John T. Flynn presents comprehensive research and come to the following list of the components of fascism as implemented through policy. As the author says, fascism “is a form of social organization…

  1. In which the government acknowledges no restraint upon its powers — totalitarianism
  2. In which this unrestrained government is managed by a dictator — the leadership principle
  3. In which the government is organized to operate the capitalist system and enable it to function — under an immense bureaucracy
  4. In which the economic society is organized on the syndicalist model, that is by producing groups formed into craft and professional categories under supervision of the state
  5. In which the government and the syndicalist organizations operate the capitalist society on the planned, autarchical principle
  6. In which the government holds itself responsible to provide the nation with adequate purchasing power by public spending and borrowing
  7. In which militarism is used as a conscious mechanism of government spending, and
  8. In which imperialism is included as a policy inevitably flowing from militarism as well as other elements of fascism.”

(Source: https://mises.org/library/what-fascism)

(A note on coming posts: Back in my post, “The Issue of Standards”, I discussed the ambiguity of the typical left-right paradigm. The terms conservative and liberal carry a complex, confusing and dynamic—changing—history. As I am able, this will be the focus of coming posts. Sign up for my email to know when each one is posted!)

*I’ll have a post in the future expanding on what nationalism is; history always presents a much more complex and interesting picture than the media narrative.

Middle East Conflict – Part 4: The Current Mess in Syria

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A quick TV sound bite just doesn’t do justice to the current mess the U.S. has decided merits its own entanglement in and attention to in the Middle East. That’s what this post will ultimately attempt to clear up.

My first three posts on the Middle East conflicts laid out important background necessary to understanding the current scenario. You can access those here: Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3.

Now on to our fourth part (but perhaps not our last…?).

Recall the U.S. interventions discussed in the previous post. If you need a refresher, I’d recommend revisiting that post before continuing with this one. If you’re prepared with where we’re at in the narrative, then read on!

There is one more event that I need to discuss to help build our context, this one vaguely alluded to in the previous post. To complicate the web of policy, prior to the First Iraq War in 1990-91, the U.S. policy had actually been in support of Saddam

A group of Iranians during the 1970s

Hussein during his war with Iran (1980-1988). In 1979, after a long-brewing backlash against the U.S.-backed Shah in Iran, demonstrations turned into revolution—or perhaps more accurately described, as is often the case in revolution, in multiple revolutions with varying ends. Ultimately, fundamentalist Shi’ite Muslims won the day, installing the Ayatollah as sovereign in social, religious and political life, and transforming what had progressed into a remarkably secular culture back toward their version of Shari’a.

Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989)

In all this mess, the U.S. was a natural adversary of the new regime. In addition to propping the Shah up back in 1953, they also allowed him sanctuary in the U.S. in 1979 when Iranians demanded he stand trial in Iran.

Consequently, when strongman dictator, Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, declared war on and invaded Iran the following year in 1980, the U.S. (and other Western countries) readily offered financial and supply aid. The long and bloody war essentially ended in a draw. (Incidentally, the Ayatollah’s effective halt to the Iraqi army and the war itself helped rally

far greater support for the Ayatollah among Iranians than prior to the war). And it was just a few years later that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, sparking the U.S. retaliation that resulted in the 1990-91 operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. And we’ve made it back to that part of the story.

You’ll have to forgive me for unsatisfactorily omitting narrative elements that help to clarify the Second Iraq War beginning in 2003. For now, it is sufficient to explain that after the First Iraq War, the United Nations had demanded a close eye be kept on Saddam Hussein, and biological, nuclear and chemical development facilities were to be accessible to inspectors on demand. At first relatively compliant, Hussein slowly restricted their access throughout the 1990s, prompting U.S. bombing of Iraq under President Bill Clinton in 1998. But it wasn’t until 2003, with an alleged goal of taking out presumed nuclear weapon programs (which proved nonexistent), that we began a full-fledged invasion.

That story is important in regard to the current situation in Syria. Of the Iraqis, about 60% adhere to the Shi’ite tradition and 20% to the Sunni tradition. Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, had risen through the ranks through the revolutionary activity of his uncle, and once dictator, implemented both some secular socialist policy, and strict one-party rule (a common theme for the Middle East dictators of the second half of the 20th Century, if you haven’t caught that). While I’m not going into extensive detail regarding the terrors of his regime, he put down opposition brutally, killed thousands of Kurdish Iraqis with poison gas, and bombed some his own towns. At the same time, he allowed for some economic and educational freedoms not known before in Iraq. A mixed record with terrible abuses, to be sure!

Why does all this matter? Because when the U.S. deposed him in 2003 (declared a stunningly rapid success at the time), it opened the floodgates to Al-Qaeda, a Sunni-based military, members of which flowed into Iraq from Afghanistan and other nearby states, building on the already angry rhetoric spewing from people like their leader, Osama bin Laden. For a decade, the U.S. found itself caught in in the middle of a vicious civil, sectarian war. Oddly enough, that put the U.S. on the side of Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias in Iraq, which, with the U.S. military, virtually kicked the ruling Sunnis and their adherents out of Bagdad (which is now 85-90% Shi’ite). Numerous Sunni militias formed in opposition, and many eventually joined Al-Qaeda.

But we still need to link back to Syria. Don’t worry; we’re still headed there.

After a few years of siding with the Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias in Iraq (which of course, inadvertently supported the Ayatollah in Iran), the Bush administration began a policy switch (called the “Redirection”) in 2006, shifting support back toward Sunni groups, but primarily in neighboring Syria. Wikileaks documents from that time expose a deliberate desire to provoke a Sunni uprising in Syria with the intention of destabilization there. This was corroborated by further leaked Pentagon papers in 2011. Now operating under the Obama administration, these latter documents state that, “there is a possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist principality in eastern Syria, and this is exactly what the supporting powers [of anti-Assad groups] want in order to isolate the Syrian regime….”. Who is referred to as the supporting powers? The U.S. and her allies. The same leaked documents listed “The West, Gulf Countries and Turkey” as the “supporting” powers, while also listing “Russia, China and Iran” as the powers supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime (background described in Part 2). (In fairness, the same leaked document admitted that such a organization as mentioned would threaten the peace process of Iraq.)

Quick clarification: The “Salafist” ideology referenced here is the radical Islamic fundamentalist ideology that drives Al-Qaeda, ISIS and other ideologically-affiliated groups.

In other words, U.S. policy in Iraq was in support of Iranian-backed Shi’ite groups, while at the same time favoring, or at least not opposing (but to be clear, not directly facilitating) the creation of a fundamentalist group in eastern Syria that would destabilize that country and help promote the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad. (Yes, I know the big question is “why.” Keep reading; I will get there.)

That fundamentalist group proved to be ISIS—the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

Now, that doesn’t mean that the U.S. policy actively supported ISIS (and obviously, the U.S. is no friend of ISIS; quite the opposite), but it is hard to imagine the creation of ISIS without U.S. intervention in the Middle East.

But I get ahead of myself…again.

Opposition to the Assad regime in Syria grew steadily in 2011 into a full-fledged sectarian, multi-faced civil war that many of my readers will have followed on the news for years, now. From the beginning, U.S. policy has been clearly on behalf of “moderate” rebel groups in Syria. Why use quotes? Because moderate, of necessity, must be used loosely. Virtually all opposition groups to Assad are sectarian and fundamentalist, though certainly some are more extreme than others.

Of these groups, perhaps the most powerful in early opposition days of 2011 and 2012 was al-Nusra (alternatively known as the al-Nusra Front), which was essentially the Syrian arm of al-Qaeda.

The problem is, many of these “moderate” groups supported by the U.S. ultimately became arms procurement groups for al-Nusra, meaning that many ultimately got their funding by selling weapons to al-Nusra, some of these weapons even supplied to them by the U.S.

So why did the U.S. even care about destabilizing and ultimately seeing the replacement of Assad in Syria? I alluded to this before. Two key U.S. allies, Israel and Saudi-Arabia, were both clearly upset by U.S. support of Shi’ites in Iraq. Assad, himself a nominal Shi’ite, is a primary ally of Iran. As both the Bush and Obama administrations have been clear about, though somewhat hidden under humanitarian rhetoric, taking out Assad would be a clear strike against Iran and a clear benefit for both Israel, which has a vested interest in ensuring that their own bordering enemies don’t grow too strong, and Saudi-Arabia, an avowed enemy of Assad.

Back to ISIS.

Virtually non-existent in 2012, ISIS was another group pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda. In 2013, it had a falling out with al-Nusra, putting the two groups at odds. In 2014, as many will recall, the nearly unheard of ISIS suddenly captured major Syrian cities, and expanded rapidly across eastern Syria and into Iraq, reaching as far as the outskirts of Bagdad. And of course, as many readers know, ISIS has declared itself an Islamic Caliphate, brutally claiming the lives of countless Christians, non-Sunni Muslims, westerners, and anyone else who doesn’t pledge allegiance to their ideology and rule.

So now what? The complexities of who supports who against who with who is enormous, and I won’t go into all that detail in writing. My goal has been to explain how things have come to where they are now. In conclusion, I include two videos below. The first, in addition to the visual benefit, does an excellent job explaining the current mess. The second is a piece by investigative journalist Ben Swann with revealing statistics on the tragedies of what has transpired in the Middle East.

Googling “before” and “after” pictures of Syria reveals many terrible scenes like this one, taken in Aleppo, one of the largest cities in Syria.

All in all, it’s hard (yes, I do tend to write in deliberate understatements) to show anyone walking away from the mess with clean hands. Perhaps we should understand that there are no praise-worthy members of this conflict. Millions of Syrians are now refugees, displaced, many finding solace in the same ideology that drives ISIS. Towns once thriving metropolitan areas are haunted by rubble and silence. Numbers uncounted have had their lives destroyed or taken. This does not imply that the situation under the dictators was good, but its certainly hard to make the claim that things are better. Perhaps, going forward, we should consider the unintended, or often very much intended, consequences of policy. So far, nearly every policy decision has led to its own bitter fruit of greater problems and more lives destroyed. A dose of humility and reflection may be in order. Watch the two videos below:

Thanksgiving in Perspective

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hith-pilgrims-eMany of us were raised with a romanticized rendition of the story of the Pilgrims, a story that still brings back my childhood memories of Indians and Pilgrims placing fish in the ground with corn seeds, smiling and gathering around a large table with the cornucopia and all the trimmings that adorn Thanksgiving tables today. (There are many misconceptions about the “first thanksgiving” that I am not going to be addressing. A fellow blogger has done an excellent job of that here: “The First Thanksgiving?“)

And while it wasn’t the first thanksgiving celebration ever to be celebrated, and romanticized exaggerations aside, most of us haven’t the faintest idea what it would have been like. Finding themselves increasingly at odds with the Anglican clergy and legal system in England, the small group of Separatists had moved from Scrooby, England to Holland, where they found themselves remarkably accepted. Nevertheless, opportunities for making a living were somewhat limited, the lure of Dutch culture for very conservative English was a presumed threat from parents, and the outbreak of the 30 Years’ War threatened Holland with another invasion from Catholic Spain.

So they left again.

This time, to settle just south of the Dutch colony of New Amsterdam at the mouth of the Hudson River (modern-day New York). Still, the land they hoped to settle on was still within what was claimed as British Virginia.

When a plane takes us across the Atlantic in four to five hours, we can’t fathom weeks of sea travel amidst the tempestuous whims of the weather.

When our legal systems protect our expressions of faith, by and large, we can’t imagine what it was like to have to meet in secret for not sharing the common denominational association as the church prescribed by king and parliament.

When we drive five minutes to pick up as much food as we can eat—and then some—for any meal, let alone Thanksgiving, we have no hope of empathy with those who only ate what they themselves planted, nurtured and harvested.

When we can “bump up the heat” because we’re uncomfortably cold at 70 degrees Fahrenheit, there is not a chance that we can put ourselves in the shoes of those who lived exposed to the cold and knew that it may well take their lives.

When we can run to the clinic for a quick diagnosis and cure, lost to our memory is a time when a simple flu could just as likely kill as not.

In 1620, 102 Pilgrims landed in what would later become Massachusetts, five-hundred miles off-course, in land not particularly claimed by anyone. Given poor conditions, they couldn’t sail right up the coast a little ways to New Amsterdam for supplies.

That first winter, 45 people died.

At your family gathering this Thanksgiving, imagine half dead in 6 months. I apologize for the morbidity, but I am guessing you can’t. I can’t. Or, at least, I won’t.

So maybe instead of that disheartening image, understand that we are far more blessed than we can ever imagine. We have a standard of living that far exceeds any other known to any other group—poor, middle class or rich—in the history of the world.

The Pilgrims understood thankfulness. Do we?the_first_thanksgiving_cph-3g04961

A series of studies published in what has been known as the Happiness Literature conducted in recent years shows something that might otherwise be considered common sense: that people become accustomed to their standard of living, and that becomes a baseline for expectation. In essence: we become accustomed to what we have, and take it profoundly for granted.

So how can we be thankful? It has to do with expectations.

Thankfulness can only be truly derived from accurate expectations and accurate perspective. If I expect to be fed well on Thanksgiving Day, my thankfulness for that meal will be nominal. All the more if I expect it will be provided to me because I deserve it.

True thankfulness understands our blessings in perspective.

Much-needed perspective.

In December of 1621, Edward Winslow was able to write, “by the goodness of God, we are so far from want….” Ninety natives joined the Pilgrims for three days of feasting. Almost every single person there had lost someone–more probably several–they loved in the previous year. And yet, they were thankful. Let me rephrase: therefore, they were thankful. They understood the true blessing of what they had.

cornucopiaDo we?

Addendum: Let me make one more observation, if I may. Thankfulness reveals more about a person’s character than many other expressions or attitudes. Gratefulness is an attitude of maturity.

May you and yours have a blessed and thoughtful Thanksgiving.

(Don’t have time to read it? Enjoy the audio below. And please forgive small hiccups; this is my first time to record a post.)

Middle East Conflict–Part 3: Roots of Modern Radical Islamic Movements

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The last two posts of the Middle East have offered a bird’s eye view of the political development of the Middle East since the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. In this post, I’ll continue to build the modern narrative toward current Western intervention by highlighting key events that led to the rise of radical Islamic groups such as Al-Qaeda (and its offshoot, ISIS).

First, a quick recap: After the division of the Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations divided the Middle East (and North Africa) into protectorate states under the jurisdiction of France and England under the condition that these protectorate states (or mandates) would earn independence as they learned to rule themselves. After World War II, Britain and France largely withdrew from the region, leaving unstable civilian governments in place, governments that were replaced in rapid succession after the Israeli War of Independence (1947-8) by secular military dictatorships. This is the time period during which Hafez al-Assad, Muammar Gadhafi, and others came into power.

And while local and national politics are, of course, more detailed and complex, this bird’s eye view is sufficient for our purposes.

The decades following these new regimes (roughly from the 1960s and 1970s to the 1990s and 2000s) were characterized by continued authoritarian rule, the silencing of political opposition, economic stagnation, political corruption related to the oil industry, and suppression of minority groups or ethnicities.

These conditions, quite understandably, fueled opposition movements against the regimes in place. These opposition movements, very broadly speaking, fell into two main veins: secular opposition and radical opposition. Secular opposition was, for the dictators, much easier to control and silence; they did not gain much support from a largely Islamic population, and accusations of atheism were far more effective in keeping larger numbers from joining.

The other opposition vein, Islamic radicalism, however, began to see considerable growth, especially in the late 1990s. In countries across the Middle East, revolts spiked against the dictatorial regimes, largely without success for the time being. What drove and fueled these revolts?

In addition to the conditions described above and the very fact that the dictatorships were largely secular, American culture had begun to show up in cities. American rock music and secular culture, mostly permitted under the regimes of the time, was an easy rhetorical target for Islamic fundamentalists who saw this as a gross violation of their beliefs, and those who felt the same were often drawn into their rhetoric. The fundamentalists and their more extreme counterpart, the radicals, advocated a return to their own form of Shari’a Law.

But such movements had much more dangerous roots; these were not the only reasons for the increase in the Islamic fervor. Let me walk you through a number of events crucial to understanding the current chaos the Middle East.

Many radical groups could point to direct U.S. intervention that had already operated in nearby Iran (Persia). And that takes us back to a very important story in our understanding of the Middle East…

We’ve so far neglected Iran, as it wasn’t a part of the Ottoman Empire (it had been at one point, but not by 1914) and, therefore, not a mandate created from its demise. After World War I, the British began to invest heavily in Iran for a couple of reasons. First, it served as an important buffer zone between the increasingly powerful Soviet Empire just to the north and the very valuable British colony of India (which at that time included what is modern-day Pakistan). Second, the British established a very lucrative oil industry on the Gulf of Persia.

There is a very important distinction that needs to be addressed in a later post: that Iran (and more than 50% of Iraq) is heavily Shi’ite (or Shi’a), while much of the rest of the Middle East adhere to the Sunni tradition. This makes Iran a natural enemy of Sunni regimes, such as Saudi Arabia. That particular distinction would fuel conflict between Iran and Sadam Hussein’s Sunni government. But that needs to be left for later development.

In any case, Iran was becoming increasingly democratic and secular throughout much of the 20th Century, especially after 1920 and a civil war at that same time. Although ruled by a Shah (king), a parliament and its chosen Prime Minister were gaining popularity and influence. A key reason for this was anger fueled against the Shah who, in the 1920s, sold all Iranian oil rights to Great Britain until 1993.

Mohammad Mossadegh, Prime Minister of Iran, 1953

Mohammad Mossadegh, Prime Minister of Iran, 1953

Enraged, an increasingly assertive Iranian Parliament chose as their Prime Minister in 1953, Mohammad Mossedegh, who followed up his election with the widely popular nationalization of the British oil industry operating in Iran. With British oil and imperial interests at stake, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, pushed the U.S. for help in operating a coup in Iran. An aggressive Allen Dulles, CIA director, and his brother, John Dulles, Secretary of State, convinced Eisenhower to “okay” the coup, which the CIA successfully operated from the U.S. Tehran embassy. They placed Mossadegh under house arrest and propped up the diminished power of the Shah.

The reasons for the U.S. operation of the coup are far more extensive than we can examine here…another item for my “to write about list.” Nevertheless, the operation marked a sharp turning point U.S.-Middle East politics. Many politicians in Iran and across the Middle East had looked to the United States as a mediator between the aggressive British and French and their own interests. Now, having the U.S. CIA as the actor in the reassertion of a very unpopular king and the arrest of a very popular Prime Minister, anti-westerners across the Middle East had a handy source of fodder for their increasingly radical rhetoric. (In Iran particularly, this growing rhetoric would result in the tumultuous backlash Revolution of 1979, resulting in the Iranian Hostage Crisis and the rise of the supreme Shi’ite leader, known as the Ayatollah, to the helm of Iranian religious and political life. All this will be covered more in depth to come.)

Okay, return with me now to the growing radical movements of the mid- to late-1990s. Differences between Shi’ites and Sunni’s aside, the U.S. intervention in Iran had already left a deeply sour taste in the mouths of many Middle Easterners for U.S. policy when U.S. secular culture began to pop up in their cities.

And yet, were the growing frustrations of Islamic fundamentalists enough to bring unity to their various groups? Not quite.

Soviet forces in Afghanistan

Soviet forces in Afghanistan

Stick with me here. There is another story that needs to be told: Afghanistan. I’m not going in depth in the history here; just relaying an important narrative. In the 1980s, for almost a decade, Soviet forces attempted a prolonged invasion of Afghanistan. Supported and armed in part by the United States (Cold War policy in the U.S. taking a front seat here), a young Saudi Arabian named Osama bin Laden was able to successfully lead a defense of Afghanistan against the Soviets, calling this defense a “holy war” (jihad) on behalf of fundamentalist Islam.

Encouraged and emboldened by his success against the U.S.S.R., bin Laden quickly re-oriented his powerful and radical Islamic military—Al-Qaeda—to, as Professor Khater states, “recreate an Islamic state that would unite the Islamic world and replace secular or quasi-Islamic governments.”

Sadam Hussein (1980s)

Sadam Hussein (1980s)

Yet, the story is even more complicated. Another key event played a role in turning Al-Qaeda and other groups against the U.S. and not just against secular Middle Eastern governments: the First Iraq War of 1990-1991. Again, not a narrative I can expound on here, the operation of U.S. troops against the Iraqi army under Sadam Hussein (the same army the U.S. had supported against the Ayatollah of Iran in the 1980s!) was more rhetorical fodder against the U.S. Not only that, but in an often forgotten piece of foreign policy, the U.S. military bombed targets in Iraq during the late 1990s.

And pieces of the puzzle start to come together. Al-Qaeda was either directly or indirectly involved in radical revolts across Middle Eastern countries in the 1990s, all of which were unsuccessful. So in 1998, feeding on an already strong anti-American sentiment growing throughout the Middle East, Osama bin Laden openly stated his intended plans and call to arms:

“…the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples… in compliance with God’s order, we issue the follow fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim…We—with God’s help—call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it…” (quoted in Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East by Akram Fouad Khater, pages 365-365).

al4Are you beginning to see the complexities of the Middle East situation? And this only leaves further questions: what about U.S. involvement in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s? How did the U.S. alliance with the Saudi royal family come about? Why did the U.S. invade Iraq?

Yes, I know I cannot fully flesh out the material. A book, perhaps, would be a better project for that, than a blog. But perhaps I can continue to shed a bit of light on the current situation…?

So what does all this have to do with Syria? Indirectly, everything. The same radical movements that began in the 1990s continue to feed on similar fuel today. ISIS, a breakoff from Al-Qaeda, operates with the same goal of a unified Islamic Caliphate. U.S. operations in Iraq in 2001 and onward only complicated matters extensively, resulting in further backlash and entangled alliances. More on all of that to follow.

(Too busy to read this? Listen below! Please forgive the small issues; I am new to recording myself as I read.)

 

Middle East Conflict–Part 2: Protectorates to Military Rule

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In the last post, I offered clarity on the nature of the Middle East prior to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In this part, we’ll continue that narrative from the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire to the creation of individual, if somewhat complicated modern-like states.

After the Young Turks—a political movement that sought stronger ties to Europe and pushed for a modernized Turkey—was able to bring the Ottoman government under its control in 1908, they followed up with their program by eventually signing a military alliance with Germany. I don’t have time to get into all the reasons for that particular decision here, nor is that particularly relevant to our discussion, but they hoped a favorable outcome in the war would give them greater influence on the world stage, and longstanding conflict with the Russians was certainly a part of their decision.

Whatever the reasons, the results proved catastrophic for the empire, and the once large and powerful Ottoman Empire came to an end. In Paris in 1919, among the number of treaties forced on the losers of the war by the Allies* was the Treaty of Sévres, the treaty made with the Ottomans.

Under the treaty terms, Turkey would be left with most of Anatolia. The vast majority of the remainder of Ottoman territory would become League Mandates—essentially, protectorate states of the newly created League of Nations. In practice, this meant that Britain and France would govern these territories. So what were these territories?

mid_east_ethnic_lg

Ethnic groups in the Middle East (I am aware you can’t read the key; a quick Google search will turn this or a similar map up)

Hold that thought for a moment. Remember how complicated the Middle East was? The region is awash in various ethnicities. To name a few: Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Azeri, Arabs, Jews, Persians, et cetera. This is only on the broad level, as within each of these and the other ethnicities are different groups that can be more and more localized. In additional to ethnic differences were vast arrays of cultural differences region by region and even village by village, differences hard to perceive to westerners observing through media reports. Also, there were key religious differences, differences beyond the standard three thought of by those who have not studied the region: Jewish, Christian and Muslim. The most volatile of differences perhaps is between the Sunni and Shi’ite (alternatively, Shi’a) traditions of Islam, which have been in conflict since the death of Mohammad (forgive me for not expanding on this here, as I am sensitive to length).

So how do you organize such differences into protectorate states? Add onto these differences the basic understanding that the modern idea of a political state was all but a foreign concept.

mandateNevertheless, the League of Nations (again, mostly the British and French) set about drawing up borders and labeling the regions within them. And each new protectorate was promised independence as soon as it had learned how to self-govern. That was the mandate in the Treaty of Sévres.

In essence, modern political states—or nations (in our context)—had to be invented.

And so the protectorate states of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan (later to be renamed Jordan), Iraq, et cetera, came into existence. In Syria, my ultimate direction with this background, the Syrian people group (versus the Kurds, Assyrians or Arabs), having gained the name of their nation, quickly assumed that the nation must be mostly Syrian—that Syrian must be the “national” ethnic group. The same in Lebanon, Transjordan, and so forth. In rich sarcasm, there is but little alternative conclusion: what can go wrong? The politics that followed the dismembering of the Ottoman Empire varied state to state, but a general trend can be observed: dominant groups within each nation thought the country was uniquely theirs, as I said before. A tribal mentality among the leaders would be more and more resented by other tribes and groups, before military dictatorships would ultimately come into power. But I get ahead of myself.

Some protectorate states, such as Palestine and Iraq, were put under British control, and others, such as Syria and Transjordan, came under French jurisdiction. Both nations maintained relatively strict control over their mandates (the French more so than the British), as the terms of independence had been based on the vague and open-ended condition that each nation learn to govern itself. And particularly in the case of France, the French regulators in their territories operated mostly to benefit France at the expense of the local population.

European dominance ended with World War II. Despite emerging as victors, the British economy and military apparatus could no longer support their vast colonial empire, and the French, under German control for the duration of the war, were clearly in no better a position. The Middle East mandate nations were neglected by their European overlords.

And naturally, Middle Eastern overlords filled the void. However, the process by which these overlords could come into power was rooted in the European governance system. In an effort to turn their invented states into functioning nations, the British and French had supported the creation of highly-integrated and diversified militaries. Why? Apart from the practical goal of using the military as their enforcement branch, the Europeans were attempting to build a sense of nationalism – a strong sense of nation (for example, “we are Jordanians” as more predominant than “we are Arabs”) – in a place where no such idea had previously existed. Where better than a nationalistic military made up of many different ethnicities?

And as Europeans withdrew to lick their wounds, many military dictators rose to the forefront of the political scene. Where civilian leaders were reputed to be seen as sectarian and corrupt**, military leaders boasted on their nationalistic and diversified bases.

A young Muammar Qaddafi of Libya

A young Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, one of the multiple military dictators to take control of former League Mandate countries

Still, most states were ruled by civilian governments ruled in the wake of the European withdrawal. One key event resulted in numerous military dictatorships coming to power: the Israeli War of Independence of 1947-1948. Despite massive financial and military support from Middle Eastern and North African countries all over the region, from Syria to Iraq to Saudi Arabia to Egypt, the Palestinians still ultimately lost the war, throwing nearly every nation in the area into instability. Civilian governments further lost credibility with their people, and some wanted the stability and diversity offered by military rule.

And as they did so, military commanders took over. During the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Algeria and Yemen all saw their governments taken over by military dictators. In Syria, the military commander Hafez al-Assad, father of the current Bashar al-Assad, took over the government***.

Hafez al-Assad

Hafez al-Assad

What did these military dictatorships look like? Contrary to the naïve opinion that they were strictly Shari’a-based, most were, in fact, mostly secular in nature. Also, most, including the government under Hafez al-Assad, were highly authoritarian (see this post for more on the basic terms) and fascist.

As expected, honeymoons celebrating the new governments were short-lived, if lived at all, and opposition was shortcoming. But with the military apparatus in place, dictators like Hafez al-Assad did not tolerate dissent, putting it down quickly and brutally. For most, when their sons or heirs took their place, the same policy continued, and does so still under Bashar al-Assad in Syria (where he still has control).

And they earned themselves the reputation they are notorious to westerners for today: strict, harsh, intolerant and powerful authoritarians. And one by one, these military dictators and their dynasties have been or are replaced. Part of the reason: what has been labeled “the Arab Spring.” Part has been due to Islamic radicalism. Finally, Western intervention, as in Iraq, Libya and now Syria, has also played a key role. But this is where the modern narrative really begins to get messy. Why and how did the U.S. and other European powers get involved in the modern state of affairs? More than that to come.

 

*To note, Woodrow Wilson of the U.S. had lofty goals for the Paris Peace Conference, but few points were realized; the British, French and to a lesser extent, the Italians, essentially had control of the peace terms.

**And notably, for our purposes, in Syria, where the French had not allowed indigenous populations to be involved in the government.

***Assad did not officially become Prime Minister until 1970, but moved through the ranks and worked to operate a coup in 1963. He would rule until 2000.

Middle East Conflict–Part 1: Under the Ottomans

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Our political candidates and commentators bring up Syria quite often. And with reason. The nation is embroiled in conflict–a very, very complicated conflict. What on earth is going on over there? Should we be over there? Well, like most things, it’s rooted in history–in this case, a history often overlooked and/or not understood by westerners. I get into the history first, and this will all help to make the current situation there make much more sense, and maybe offer some clarity to you all that our political “elites” really need to understand.

Yes, we know there is a large Islamic caliphate and terrorist organization known as ISIS. We know there is a massive emigration and refugee movement from war-torn regions. We understand that there is a leader in Syria who these same elites claim must be transitioned out of power. We know that the U.S. has been involved in Middle East affairs for at least a decade and a half (we’ve been involved much longer, but many of my own generation are not aware of this).ht_isis_parade_libya_06_jc_150219_4x3_992

I’m going to take this particular blog, and a few afterward, to bring clarity to the current situation in particularly Syria and more broadly the Middle East. Specifically, I hope to do so by shedding light on important history regarding the formation of the modern Middle East and then details on the intricate labyrinth and nebulous nature of the current and numerous interests all operating specifically in Syria.

Truly, it’s something of a madhouse. For a glimpse, consider that at this moment…

  • The U.S. supports Sunni rebel groups in Syria while supporting Shi’ite forces in Iraq
  • The U.S. supports Kurdish forces in Northern Iraq, as well as Al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Syria, who both fight each other and who both fight against Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian dictator
  • The U.S. is targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which Russia is also doing, and at the same time opposed to Russia’s support of Assad
  • The U.S. is opposed to the Badr Brigade in Syria, the same group that served as a primary ally in the Iraq War.
  • The Kurds, a current key U.S. ally, have a branch operating against Erdogan, the dictator of Turkey, another U.S. ally in the Middle East.

And I am only brainstorming a little bit of what could be the full enumeration…

I’ll get to all that! But first, how did the modern Middle East develop as it did? Many westerners are offered a vague, watered-down fly-over version of Middle Eastern history that amounts to something like, “There was a Roman Empire and then the Eastern Roman Empire, then there were Muslims, then a few Crusades and the evil Europeans tried to take over Palestine, and then mysteriously we have modern European nations that are ruled by evil dictators (in some countries) who need to be replaced by benevolent American and European foreign policy experts.”

The full picture gets as omitted from historical lessons as Kansas does by national Democratic candidates. And granted, that may in part be due to its complexity.

Now, while the importance of understanding the longer-range history of the Middle East merits its own study, I am only going back to the late Ottoman Empire (in this post) and afterward (in the upcoming posts), as the politics following the end of the Ottoman Empire are the most pertinent in understanding the present in places like Syria and Iraq. Ask many an American what the Ottoman Empire is, and you’ll get the same look you might by asking them to interpret the Star-Spangled Banner in Chinese.

ottoman_empire_b

The empire saw steady decline from its height in the 16th and 17th Centuries until the beginning of the 20th Century, by which point, on the eve of World War I, it was known as the “sick man of Europe.” A “last minute” attempt in 1908-1914 to secularize and industrialize Turkey (the heart of the empire) was too little, too late; in the end, a decision to enter the war on the side of the Germans and Austria-Hungarians secured their ultimate end. This landed the empire in the hands of the British and French victors, who, as we’ll see shortly, got to do what I consider to be a favorite activity of theirs: drawing lines on maps and calling them borders. (Forgive my oversimplification here; I will hope to offer some clarity to this point in the next post.)

The whole purpose of my commentary on this background is important to understanding the current Middle Eastern situation. Under the Ottoman Empire, for the greater part of its rule in the latter years, the Sultan and his government in Istanbul allowed for broad decentralized power. What this meant was that, outside of Turkey itself, the lands under Ottoman territory were somewhat lightly regulated by Istanbul, despite mandates that the peoples of the empire uphold Shari’a—Islamic—Law. Regions within the entirety of the empire were required to pay their taxes to Istanbul, but there was little to no extensive military or bureaucratic web able to secure any strict code of law across the entirety of the mostly-desert empire.

Istanbul c.1900 (still called Constantinople by many Europeans at that time)

Istanbul c.1900 (still called Constantinople by many Europeans at that time)

And this is not to say that there was none of this; certainly that is not the case. Nor is this to say that the empire was one of consequential liberty; that is also a false conclusion. Certainly, many regions—especially the more populated—of the Ottoman Empire were ruled by their own local overlords in any variety of Islamic code, and the legal system would have been strictly based in Shari’a for many people (with exceptions, often at the expense of an additional tax; many Christians lived in modern-day Syria and some Jews lived in Palestine).

Nevertheless, much of the empire was set up in a very decentralized fashion based in local regions and ethnicities. Much was feudalistic, with a local landlord overseeing various regions of peasant-workers, other parts were more loosely governed in a sort of farming or herding tenancy-based system (as was much of the case in Palestine). Professor Akram Fouad Khater, in his source document anthology, Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East, explains the situation succinctly: “Before World War I, the Middle East and North Africa were fluid geopolitical spaces in which peoples with various languages, cultures, and ethnicities intermingled in the cities and larger towns and many others lived in rural isolation” (page 109, 2003 edition).

The main point, here, is that the Middle East is no less ethnically complicated than the tribes of North America upon the arrival of Europeans (which a quick google image search can show was covered in a multiplicity of various tribes).

In essence, there were no nations as we think of them today. There were many, many tribes and ethnicities and some large and some nuanced religious differences among them all as a part of a broader, loosely administrated empire. (And for all you PC-obsessed folks out there, I am not saying the Middle East was some epitome of perfect unity in diversity…that’s hogwash. Certainly the Middle East was as laden in inter and intra-religious, ethnic, and political conflict as anywhere else. That’s not the point here. The point is to understand what the Middle East was like prior to the modern states that compose it now so that we can understand how the creation of those states contributes to the current U.S.-embroilment in places like Iraq and Syria.)

Again, Khater puts it very well: “None of their political experiences prepared them to conceive of a political entity that was smaller than an empire and larger than a city or village” (page 110).

Enter France and Great Britain to figure out a new way to administer the Middle East in the wake of the Ottoman defeat in World War I. That’s next.

The Electoral College: An Issue of Federalism

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On the LCKeagy Facebook Page recently, I asked those who had liked the page about what topics they would like me to address. One of the two responses was, “I’d be interested to read your views on the electoral college. Is it good for modern America? Would eradicating it really provide a better representation of voters?”

This seems particularly fitting, given the current season. While I am avoiding any commitment, at this point, to digging into the specific politics of the election, I hope to shed some light on what the Electoral College is and some clarity regarding its historical and present relevancy, and I hope to offer a bit of the Framers’ own discussions around the executive and what role it would have. This is what they didn’t teach you in high school.

So what is the Electoral College? Essentially, the Electoral College is the system whereby each state chooses their electors: a group of people who are ultimately responsible for electing the president. Each state is apportioned a number of electors equal to their total number of representatives in the U.S. Congress. For example, Arkansas has two senators and four House representatives, so Arkansas sends six electors to the Electoral College.

b-electoral-state-graphic-ggWith 538 electors attending the College, which meets and votes in December, a candidate must win 270 votes. If any candidate fails to win 270 votes, the Constitution mandates that the president will be picked by the House of Representatives.

Perhaps one of the key controversies of the Electoral College is that for all but two states (Nebraska and Maine), all electors from a state will vote one way. In other words, all six electors from Arkansas will vote for whoever wins the popular vote in Arkansas in a “winner-takes-all” system. The controversy on the state level is that, hypothetically, if 51% of voters vote for candidate X, all six Arkansas electors (or, all 55 from California) will go to the Electoral College pledged to vote for candidate X.

On the national level, this has proven particularly controversial because it allows for a candidate to win the national popular election, while losing the Electoral College election, which has happened a total of five times in U.S. history, the most recent being the Gore vs. Bush election of 2000. This possibility has merited many to call for an end to the College.

Before offering my own evaluation of the college in its modern context, I think it is particularly important to understand why it was created in the first place. This verges a bit into the broader discussion of the Constitutional Framers, which I will expound on more satisfactorily in the future.

First of all, it is important to look at the whole purpose of the office of the presidency.

There are a few key things to keep in mind about the creation of the presidency. First, Americans of the late 1700s had a deep and abiding skepticism and fear of a powerful executive who could exercise power similar to the King or Prime Minister of England. Second, there was no executive under the first United States government attempt in the Articles of Confederation, mostly for that very reason.

When the Framers met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 during what would quickly become the Constitutional Convention, they were faced with the task of addressing alleged problems of the Articles of Confederation, one of which was that there was no executive, and hence no enforcement branch of the Congress. Many offered suggestions such as the creation of an executive body—a small number of people who would carry out the executive function. Alexander Hamilton, in contrast, proposed a monarch-like figure, a proposal quickly dismissed by the vast majority of the delegates.

Most importantly, there was discussion about what sort of role this executive would play. Would they serve as a national symbol of greatness, as King George did in England? Would they take an understated roll of merely carrying out the tasks of Congress? What does the ‘executive function’ even mean? Many delegates, sharing their country-men’s fears of a powerful executive, were prone to keep an executive-free government, as under the Articles, but in the end, most agreed on a few key roles justifying the creation of an executive.

First, the executive would serve as a chief foreign diplomat, to work with the Senate in foreign affairs. Second, the president would serve as an arbiter over Congressional legislation; they gave him the veto power (after some arguments about it) in order to veto unconstitutional (not merely unpopular) legislation. Finally, they wanted the president to carry out any Congressional legislation, which at that time primarily related to ensuring that conflicts between states were resolved and tariffs collected. Nevertheless, the question of what the presidency would be was open-ended in some respects. Given the concern about a monarchical president and the Framer’s own fears of power, this is quite curious.

George Washington

George Washington

The reason is that it was evident to everyone that George Washington, the American Cincinnatus, as he was nicknamed, would fill that role, and Washington was perhaps more trusted than any other single individual in U.S. history, especially among the Framers. Still, during the ratification debates, state conventions worried about federal power prone to abuse, were assured that federal power would be limited to the exclusively what the Constitution delegated (more discussion on this later).

After resolving as best they could the question of the executive function and make-up, the Framers faced the issue of how the executive would be chosen. In England, the executive function was delicately split between a Prime Minister chosen by Parliament, and a hereditary monarch. Some entertained the idea of a president chosen by Congress, like the Prime Minister, but of course the idea of a hereditary executive wasn’t given the light of day. Still, there were enough people concerned about the potential way that power could be abused if Congress had full say over the executive. An alternative was to put it to a popular vote on a national level, a decision which they ultimately turned down for a variety of reasons. Discussions during the Convention reveal concerns about the opportunity for popular elections to lead to the election of popular executives who might use that popularity to absorb more and abuse that power. Washington issued the same concern directly in his farewell address.

Key to understanding this whole issue, however, is the issue of federalism: the system whereby the states submitted to Congress certain powers, but maintained for themselves any powers not enumerated for Congress. There is much more that must be said here, and will be said in time, but ultimately this was reflected in the 10th Amendment, an amendment crucial to many states in order to even secure their ratification of the Constitution.

Why is federalism important? Because ultimately the Electoral College was a compromise rooted in federalism. The vast majority of the debate in Philadelphia in 1787 was around what powers the new federal government would have (aka, what powers the states would delegate to it). Central to this was that states would ultimately retain sovereignty over the federal government. (And despite modern commentaries that ignore this issue, it is logical enough: why would states, so recently having fought for independence from a power sovereign over them, give up that sovereignty once more? I will have much more to say on this to make my case as the blog continues).

Ultimately, the Framers agreed to a separate body of delegates wholly separate from the legislature (Congress) that would chose the president. These delegates would be, in turn, chosen by the states (which at that time meant state legislatures). And this is where the idea of federalism played a key role: it was the states that would choose their electors. The executive would be a branch of the federal government created by the states, much like the Senate (prior to the 17th Amendment, state legislatures chose Senators). It was one more important way that states would retain their sovereignty over the newly created federal government.

And despite all the ways that this doesn’t fit in the American psyche well today, this was not particularly controversial for early Americans: state legislatures were the primary representatives of the people, and the federal government, especially the Senate and the Presidency, were representatives of the state legislatures.

So what changed? I’ll address two key changes that affect how we view the presidency and the election process today.

jacksonian-democracyFirst, during the early 19th Century, the country became increasingly democratic. Suffrage expanded significantly, modern political parties were formed, and more and more people engaged in politics from the local level upward. The democratization of society pressured more and more state legislatures to turn over the choosing of the presidential electors to the people of their states. And as time went on, all states eventually did so. That is why we go to the polls to vote, and by daybreak know who the next president will be, weeks before the official Electoral College vote. We chose our states’ electors (practically speaking, we dictate who they will vote for).

Theodore Roosevelt

Theodore Roosevelt

Second, the view of the presidency as a state-chosen position changed radically with Theodore Roosevelt, who more than probably any other president propagated that the president was the unique representative of all Americans. This is certainly how the president is viewed today, and has been ever since Teddy Roosevelt. And with that, the demand that the president be chosen by a national popular vote has grown, for obvious reasons.

So I’ll wrap up this rather long blog with a few key takeaways.

First, the expectations on the presidency have changed dramatically since the role was created in 1787.

Second, the presidential election system, so long as it is accomplished through the Electoral College system, is a state-by-state election process, not a national election. And this is key to remember. Voters in each state decide who that state choses for a president. Instead of at least 51% of the national vote “taking all,” at least 51% of each state vote “takes all” for that state (again, with the exception of Nebraska and Maine, both of which split their votes proportionally).

And this is what it comes down to. The federal system is all but withered today. And yes, I will have those who debate me on this, but originally federalism meant that states are ultimately sovereign and delegate certain powers to the federal government. Though there has been an uptick in the last couple decades in slight favor of states’ rights in some areas, there is little left of the Framers’ original view of federalism. (As for my part, I will argue in favor of an originalist perspective on federalism. If you have not done so, I highly recommend listening to Tom Woods’s speech on this issue and nullification here.)

But the Electoral College remains.

Should it remain? I’ll leave that to you to decide. Should we have a president who is chosen by popular vote as the unique representative of “all” American people, as Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed? Or a president who, at least in principle, is the choice of the individual and, again, in principle, sovereign states by whatever means each state chooses to assign its delegates.

And in the end, either way you stand on those questions doesn’t really make much practical difference. The Electoral College exists primarily on tradition and principle. Is that tradition and principle worth keeping it? I would argue that it is the principle that is more important than the Electoral College system itself.

Yes, I am well aware I have deviated from the typical approach to this discussion, which usually centers around how its “unfair” if the president wins the Electoral vote, but loses the popular vote, or how its “unfair” that 48 states have a “winner-takes-all” approach to choosing their delegates. Or the common, “then your vote doesn’t matter” argument for states that traditionally swing an expected way on elections. Certainly, in practical terms, it draws unique attention to a handful of swing states during each presidential election cycle.

So back to the original Facebook post: Is it good for modern America? I don’t have a clear answer. There may be a better system, a system that better preserves liberty. But this is what I do know. The broader issue of federalism is what is most important. The more power states lose, and more power the central government gathers to itself, the more our liberties are at risk. In the end, the Electoral College, while it may have been a compromise and an experiment, is still, in principle and theory, one of the last vestiges of federalism as intended by the Framers.

(For an even more in-depth analysis, read this article by Kevin Gutzman, one of my primary sources.)

The Politics of Liberty: The Principled Argument

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moe

(Copyright Bill Watterson, Calvin and Hobbes)

Kindergarten. That’s where we learned the basics of libertarianism. Don’t hurt people and don’t take their stuff.

It’s a basic ethical principle that most readers will readily nod in agreement. We want our children to live by that basic standard. Treat others as you would want to be treated. That’s the stuff of elementary.

Libertarianism, notwithstanding the agenda of the party’s eccentric activists, is a political philosophy based on that very idea. The distinction is that the libertarian will advocate that the state should not treat anyone in a way that we would not want our neighbor to treat us. Or our child to treat another in school.

If it is wrong for me to take my neighbor’s money, then it is equally wrong for me to utilize—yes, we’re coming back around—a monopoly on force to take their money and give it to me instead, or anyone else, for that matter. The government should not aggress—initiate force—against any otherwise peaceful person. And don’t get this confused The threat of force sufficiently qualifies as aggression. Nobody would consider a 200-lb bully taking the toy truck of the much smaller peer to be okay simply because the smaller boy does not defend himself and therefore avoids a losing battle.

Please don’t get me wrong. I am not of the mindset of Irwin Schiff, who died in prison for refusing to pay his taxes. It is much like the 25-mile-per-hour speed limit on the quiet road on the edge of town. I may not always like the speed limit, but I will follow it as a matter first of integrity and respect (both of which I find a fundamental part of what I believe to be a transcendent standard of morality), and second because I do not want to be out the hefty chunk of cash that I will otherwise be if caught going faster.

But maintaining my integrity on matters such as paying taxes and acquiescing to the state’s regulations, I can still advocate for the basic principles of liberty and argue that they ought to apply to the apparatus of the state. What gives officials who have a monopoly on force—and for most of us, merely the threat of force—a right to do what the average person cannot do to his neighbor?

And yes, I am aware of the abundance of arguments that are raised in opposition. “We must all pay our fair share for the protections and benefits they afford us,” is the most common raised. To sort every nuance of that out in this post would require a book (which is one reason I have a blog), so let me introduce a couple of key ideas to keep in mind, the second following from the first.

First, if you agree to the basic principles of liberty that I have stated in the previous few posts, then the burden of proof falls on you to show me why the state has a right to violate it, if indeed you think it does. Many will argue that the state is given exemption due to the legitimacy that it gains by our republican system. Let’s see if that holds up.

John Locke, an Enlightenment thinker and social contract theorist. Also a key theorist of natural rights to "life, liberty and property."

John Locke, an Enlightenment thinker and social contract theorist. Also a key theorist of natural rights to “life, liberty and property.”

Many Enlightenment thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries adhered to a somewhat abstract argument called social contract theory. Their held that everyone is duty bound to the state because, by involving themselves in society, they are submitting to a “social contract.” In this contract, they implicitly agree to do this submission, or at least, to the submission of society as a whole under whatever form of government they considered legitimate.¹ There are significant holes in this theory, most of which I do not have time to debate here, but the most significant is worth noting: why? Because I happened to be born into society, I have implicitly agreed to its terms of governance? Note that the monarchs and parliaments of the era loved this theory: it helped to justify their authoritarianism.

I know that many of my Christian readers will argue that governments are established by God, and that in itself gives the state its right to exemption from the basic principles of liberty. Romans 13:1-7 is a common place to refer to. A more holistic study of Scripture gives a more of a complex view, which again, after the fashion of relatively short posts, will not fit here. For now, I will offer one prime example. When Israel asked Samuel for a king, God’s warning was clear: the king will violate the liberties you have enjoyed by taxing you and forcing your children into labor and military service. The Lord viewed this rejection of His sovereignty with anger (Samuel 8:1-18).

Back to my previous point, social contract theory breaks down because it simply justifies the use of force by nature of people being united in society. Hardly a satisfying argument against the principles of liberty. (Incidentally, the greatest test of this argument is the state’s response to anyone choosing to not adhere to their rules. If social contract is binding by voluntarism, then ought it also allow someone to opt out? It’s almost a silly argument, further exposing the flaws of social contract theory.)

But still,” come the rebuttals, “our system of governmental approval is better. We may not like the laws, but we agree to them because we believe in the legitimacy of our lawmakers. We have elections, after all.”

Certainly, I could get into the myriad of regulations designed and enforced by the un-elected bureaucrats alone. But I don’t even need to do that. We may follow the laws because we believe in the legitimacy of those that pass them; not a poor argument, to be sure. But are elections that appoint the person that 51% of voters choose (or in some cases, even less, when a plurality alone is needed) enough on its face to justify allowing the state the exception to the basic principles of liberty?pillars-of-law-and-order2

And if you argue yes to that question, then we get to our second point that I will leave you with. If legitimacy alone, whether by elections, inheritance, or a belief in the divine right of kings (that kings have a right to rule because they are appointed by God, commonly held during the early Enlightenment period, as well as its modified rendition in dictators like Hitler) is enough to give a state the right to violate the basic principles of liberty, then a state naturally has no limits that it must follow, no measure of authoritarianism it cannot pursue. If given the exception, what ethical principles can bind it?

“But we have a Constitution!”

Yes, yes, indeed we do. So the Constitution is supposed to allow the government to violate these principles only minimally, and then bind them, as Jefferson hoped it would, beyond that? If the Constitution validates the legitimacy of the government by limiting our exposure to abuses, then it must still be judged on the merits of that canon. How well has it worked?

Is the Constitution our standard of liberty? Now, once again, don’t get me wrong; in context, the Constitution was one of the greatest protectors of liberties the world had yet seen to that point. I would happily argue that we return to a strict adherence to the Constitution from an originalist standpoint; it would be far better than what we have now. But was it a paradigm of upholding these principles? Not entirely, and while many of the Framers were fundamentally dedicated to the preservation of liberty, there were a great many other questions surrounding the creation of the document. The Constitution was a creation of men and politics as much as it was of principle (or, probably, even more so). (In the coming months, I will begin a series on the creation of the Constitution and understanding it from an originalist perspective.)

I apologize for a somewhat longer post. Still, I find it important to understand that if you agree with the principles of liberty for the average person—that you don’t hurt people and don’t take their stuff–or do not aggress against an otherwise peaceful person—and then also disagree that the state is bound by the same principles, then the burden of proof falls on you to justify the exception. And if justify you think you can, then an even more challenging burden of proof falls to justify why it is exempt in some cases and not in others.

I say, let’s return to elementary.

“But enough of principle,” you might say. “What you implicate is a total void of any government. Surely, if we went that far, chaos would erupt.” Certainly, theory is a rather useless argument on its own, and needs to go hand-in-hand with its cousin, pragmatism, right? I’ll tackle that one next time.

¹Yes, I am aware of my oversimplification of this theory. Still, I think the essence and implications of it are not lost in my explanation.

 

Water (aka Human Nature) and the State

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The LawI’ve made two arguments. First, that human nature is like water in that it tends to follow the path of least resistance in the pursuit of needs and desires and second, that the state is a monopoly on force. So how in the world do these two concepts relate?

In his superlative essay called “The Law”, 19th Century French Philosopher Frederick Bastiat laid out this case beautifully as he observed and assessed the major socialist movements in France and elsewhere across Europe (another history meriting some narrative that I don’t have time for here). What he keenly observed was this: that in the midst of their extensive and intensive poverty, people across Europe were looking increasingly toward the government as a means to better their lives at the expense of others—something that would have seemed unimaginable just centuries or even, in many countries, decades before.

Why? The necessarily short version: because a wave of “revolutions” produced governments that were becoming increasingly accountable to the people.

Well, that’s excellent! comes the reply. If you are opposed to that, you must be an advocate for tyranny under a central dictator!

Excellent or not, allow me to defend myself before I am branded an authoritarian (which is so far from true that it is laughable…but I have to convince you of that before you are able to actually laugh). I am no advocate of a central dictator; their track record of respecting private property is no better, and typically far worse than a republican or quasi-republican government!

What Bastiat observed was that people were using the new responsiveness of the government (“if I provide what these voters want, I will get re-elected”) as a tool of plunder. While it was obviously wrong to steal from their neighbors, they found it quite justifiable to elect an official who would do the stealing for them.

And as the counter-argument runs: then it’s not stealing. Why not? Let’s put another label on it, as Bastiat did, and call it, as he did: legal plunder. Certainly, electing officials who take from some to give to others is legal from the point of view that a government is legitimate.

Once again, I must dismiss implicated arguments and tangents in order to pursue my main topic in building foundations; we will put aside the question of legitimacy once more. The key point right now is “water” and the state. As the state became increasingly used as a means to take from some and give to others, more and more and more and more groups within society saw it and lobbied it and pressured it and bribed it and threatened it in order that they, too, could use it as a tool to take from some and give to others.

That is what human nature does. If, by and large, people must work to provide for their families, they will work. But if there is a path of lesser resistance, namely, the state, by which they can ease the work which they must put in for their ends, they will ultimately pursue it as a general principle. And for the immediate cries that I do not care for the miserable masses of 19th Century Europe, or the blue collar workers of today struggling paycheck to paycheck, I will annul your fears through philosophical and utilitarian arguments alike over the coming months. (Convincing you that all welfare redistribution programs actually do more harm than good is not an easy task, but I shall tackle it anyway.)

But for now, let me remind you that anywhere between 12,000 and 15,000 lobbyists are registered in Washington D.C. each year and millions upon millions of dollars are spent each year by the corporations that can afford them—the largest ones—to protect their products, their goals, their markets, et cetera. See? It is the path of least resistance if it is effective. When water cannot overcome a barrier, it will find a different way and divert its attention. In simple terms: if it were not effective, the money and time would not be spent as it is.

And do not think that the water principle does not apply to those elected to Washington. They also, as a general rule, follow the path of least resistance. It is far easier to find re-election campaign funds and donations from businesses and organizations whose interests are protected by the state.

Ultimately, when an entity with a monopoly on force can be used to achieve one’s ends easier than working for it in other ways, especially if that entity is legitimate in the eyes of the people, that path of least resistance becomes the path most taken.

 

Human Nature is Like Water

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People are like water. At least, in one way critical to understanding why I would even bother creating this entire blog.

As a Christian, I believe that human nature is inherently bent toward sin. Many libertarians and liberty-minded people disagree with me. Well, frankly, I think most people disagree with me.

But whether or not you agree with that premise, I think I can win my case about water.

Water always takes the path of least resistance. It will not climb a hill when it could run down a ravine. It will readily spray from the faucet where a hose has been poorly connected while leaving the plants at the other end just as parched as before. But it is an obvious enough idea that it really doesn’t merit further examples.

Still, allow me to make the connection to human nature. With exceptions that are more rare than normal, most people, without a great enough commitment beyond their own desires, will pursue their needs and wants in the easiest way possible. This is not always necessarily bad. For example, it drives people to industry and efficiency. Why would I learn to write html code to design this blog when I could simply use the wonderfully simple tool of WordPress?

And yet, this pursuit of self-interest along the path that creates the least friction in that pursuit often is wrong, both subtly and not so subtly. The untrained human nature will tend to try to cheat on a test if there is no possibility it could be found out and it will guarantee them an A. But it is not always so obvious and most often is more about a balancing act between integrity—doing right—and lack thereof. Can I get a good grade in this class by only skimming the book? What is the minimum number of sales I must make to earn a bonus at work? Sometimes it’s not necessarily a moral or ethical question. Will I be willing to commit a larger portion of my salary for a longer period of time in order to get that bigger house now?

See where I am going with this? Now, before those who do not believe in an external or transcendent standard of morality that would inherently condemn my suggestions that there is a fundamental right and wrong, follow me to my more practical conclusion…in my next couple of posts.