Sanctions are one of the most commonly used passive aggressive weapons by the United States government against regimes acting against its interests. These come in many kinds, from basic trade embargos to restrictions on access to international banking, et cetera.
And President Trump has recently announced a new wave of sweeping sanctions that are, as claimed, tougher than any previous against what he calls the “rogue regime”—North Korea.
While he is right with the adjective of choice regarding Kim Jong Un’s government, he—and his predecessors—overlook a key reality about the people of North Korea that render these sanctions virtually powerless.
To explain this, we need to understand the lives of the people of North Korea (and by extension, the people living under other repressive regimes, such as in Cuba or Venezuela). This may be an especially challenging task, given our lack of similar circumstances, but let us start with this basic assumption. That is, that the people of North Korea are attempting to live as normal lives as is possible given the circumstances. In the video interview at the bottom of this post, Michael Malice shares his unique insight on just this reality. Normal life in North Korea is a far cry from that of a middle-class American, of course. But North Koreans—those not attached directly to the regime—are largely doing their best to live as normal lives as they are able.
Even more significant in our understanding is this. They have also been—for three, almost four generations now—“educated” by a regime that preaches the glory of their great leaders. Their reality—what they truly believe—is that the United States, collaborating with their allies in the south, invaded Korea as an expansionist and imperial empire, seeking to replace the brutal previous Japanese occupation with their own. The gallant North Korean army firmly resisted and—in heroism paralleled by the Greek victories over the Persians—ultimately prevented the great and tyrannical United States from conquering their homeland. And from that day onward, their great leaders have valiantly defied the world and maintained the independence of North Korea. How much worse, they are told, would things be, without the unbending courage of their leaders?
And when three generations have been taught this, with so little real information trickling in
from the outside, what else do we expect them to believe?
With that as the context, then, let’s examine the effect of sanctions.
First, what is the intent of these sanctions? In this case, the consequences caused by the various restrictions are meant to pressure Kim Jong Un’s regime to halt their program of expanding the distance capacity of their long-range missiles and reducing the weight and size of their nuclear warheads. The idea: keep them from developing a nuclear missile that can reach American shores.
But will they work?
Given the context we have already described, it is easy to draw a few simple conclusions. The regime itself may be hardly affected by these sanctions; of everyone in North Korea, the politically connected will not lack for food or comfort. To the extent that sanctions harm anyone, it is the average, every-day, not politically connected North Korean. The ones struggling to live normal lives in one of the most terrible places to live on earth.
So why should we expect different when the narrative structure is already in place for their government’s message to be readily believed? That message? That the great evil of the world—the United States—is seeking once again to crush their nation for its own expansionist agenda.
It does not matter that the regime itself is to blame for the misery of the people within its security fences and guard towers. What matters is what the people believe. To the extent that sanctions cause greater suffering by restricting some goods entering the nation that might otherwise make their way in, it is cause for the people to see their stalwart government as ever more valiant in their defense. And it does not matter if these sanctions add more suffering to the people; the very presence of sanctions gives their own government a handy scapegoat.
Don’t get me wrong; I intend no insult to the North Korean people. It is pity and compassion, rather, that would look at this indoctrination and understand it for what it is. And it is the same pity and compassion that understand the detriment of sanctions that feed into this very indoctrination.
On top of this, Kim Jong Un understands something crucial. Without nuclear weapons that can reach American shores, he is at risk of going the way of Sadam Hussein, Mohamar Ghadaffi and others. To be a nuclear power and a threat to Israel (in the case of Iran) or the United States is to have a seat at the international table of diplomacy. In effect, to be taken seriously. It is not without reason the U.S. has avoided full-scale military deployment in Pakistan–a nuclear power–to round up the Taliban. Does this make Kim Jong Un’s goal noble? Of course not! But it does help us understand how determined he is; sanctions that harm his people more than they harm him will hardly serve as deterrent.
There is hope. As Michael Malice makes clear, the black market for food may be too pricy for many, but there is no such premium on the black market of information. Information is getting in. Perhaps the people of North Korea may be ever more privy to the reality that it is their own government most to blame.
But it is not sanctions that will get the work done.
Perhaps—and I may bring the scorn of all who share the moral vision that justifies sanctions—but just perhaps, it may be better to open all possible trade with North Korea. To extend the arm of diplomacy. To offer dialogue, not wield the economic sword. To do the opposite of feeding the narrative of lies that most North Koreans have only ever heard.
There are two roads that will bring down the North Korean regime (and with it, their aim of nuclear weapons), if anything can. The first is a direct American attack on the small country, resulting in the death, no doubt, of many Americans and many more North Koreans, South Koreans and perhaps even Japanese.
The second is sufficient dissent within the country, as happened in Poland in 1980. Or in Berlin in 1989. Of course, these could be brutally put down; there is no illusion about that.
But what is certain is that there is already a belief system within North Korea that the United States government has to accept. And sanctions—or even direct military action—already have a place in that narrative. The lies are too far engrained.
Thumbnail (and internal) photo credit: nedhardy.com
Photo at top of article credit: The Washington Post
